Protocol design
The Next Trillion Dollars of Stablecoins Will Be Built on Options
Vitalik proposed replacing debt and liquidations with option pairs as the base layer for synthetic dollars. We explain the idea from first principles, price it on live Deribit data, and backtest it through nine years of ETH crashes. The missing piece is an options venue.
On June 1, Vitalik Buterin posted a proposal to rebuild DeFi's synthetic dollars on options instead of debt. As the leading options protocol on RWAs we were naturally excited, and skeptical.
built from options.
Every synthetic dollar in production today is a loan. You deposit ETH, you borrow dollars against it, and the protocol keeps itself solvent by selling your collateral the moment a price feed says your cushion is too thin. Most of the worst days in DeFi's history trace back to one of those two parts, the forced selling or the price feed.
Vitalik's construction doesn't borrow anything, so there is nothing to liquidate and no feed to defend. What nobody had done was put numbers on it. We pulled the live ETH options surface and ran the strategy through nine years of crashes to find out what holding the thing actually costs.
How a synthetic dollar works today
The dominant design is the collateralized debt position (CDP), and it has barely changed since 2017. Deposit $200 of ETH into MakerDAO, mint $100 of DAI against it. The system stays solvent through one enforcement mechanism: if your collateral ratio falls below a threshold, your ETH is seized and sold, with a liquidation penalty on top, before the debt can go underwater. Aave, Liquity, and every perp venue's margin engine run the same logic with different parameters.
Notice what you paid for that $100. Your $200 of ETH is locked, earning nothing, backing half its value in usable dollars. Liquity v1 pushed the minimum to 110 percent; most systems sit at 150 percent or higher because thinner cushions liquidate constantly. Overcollateralization is the capital cost of the debt design, and the liquidation engine is its operational cost.
And the liquidation engine has a dependency that cannot be relaxed: it must know the price right now, every block, because solvency is enforced in real time. Vitalik's argument is that this dependency, not leverage itself, is the original sin:
Real-time oracles are very hard to make safe. You can only rely on a limited number of actors, who are watching real-time signals in an automated way. You cannot use mechanisms that incorporate any notion of recourse.
The history is on his side. Below are four of the worst blowups in DeFi, and only one of them was really a market crash. The rest were the oracle or the liquidation engine failing on its own.
Black Thursday is the one everyone remembers. ETH fell by half in a day, the network clogged, Maker's oracle stalled, and the keepers who were supposed to buy the seized collateral couldn't get their transactions through, partly because someone stuffed the mempool to crowd them out. The auctions cleared at zero, and Maker handed out ETH for free. The other three didn't even need a crash. Compound liquidated $89 million of loans because DAI printed $1.30 on a single exchange for a few minutes. A trader drained $116 million from Mango by pumping its own mark price. And last October, a tariff headline hit record leverage in a thin weekend book, and the auto-deleveraging spirals turned it into the largest liquidation event in crypto's history.
The industry has spent years patching this instead of replacing it. Maker delays its own price feed by an hour (the OSM) so it has time to catch a bad print. Liquity wired in an oracle fallback. Chainlink built SVR to claw back the MEV that liquidations leak. RAI dropped the dollar peg to take pressure off the mechanism. crvUSD turned the liquidation cliff into a gradual slide, though it still reads a live oracle and still sells collateral into the fall. Terra tried to skip collateral altogether and lost $40 billion in a week.
All of it still leans on the same two things: forced selling, and a price feed that has to be right every second. Vitalik wants to get rid of both.
Vitalik's idea: split the coin instead of borrowing against it
Start with the intuition before any formulas. You and a friend jointly buy 1 ETH for $1,660 and lock it in a box, to be opened on a fixed date. You agree: when the box opens, you get the first $830 of whatever the ETH is worth, your friend gets everything above that.
Think about what each of you now holds. If ETH ends at $2,500, you get your $830 and your friend gets $1,670. If ETH ends at $1,000, you still get your $830 and your friend gets $170. Your claim is worth $830 in every world except one: ETH finishing below $830, where you simply get the whole ETH. Your friend, meanwhile, holds something that moves harder than ETH itself: they paid roughly half the price of the coin for all of its upside.
You are holding a synthetic dollar. Your friend is holding leverage. Nobody borrowed anything, and there is no scenario in which either of you owes more than what is in the box, so there is nothing to liquidate, ever.
That is the entire proposal. Three names before the formulas, all three from our example: the cutoff price ($830) is called the strike, written S. Your claim, the first S dollars of the coin, is the dollar token, which Vitalik calls P. Your friend's claim, everything above the strike, is the leverage token, N. Anyone can split 1 ETH into the pair, and anyone can recombine the pair into 1 ETH, any time before expiry. At expiry an oracle reports the ETH price x, and:
- the dollar token P receives
min(1, S/x)ETH, which is worthmin(x, S)dollars - the leverage token N receives
max(0, 1 - S/x)ETH, which is worthmax(0, x - S)dollars
Options traders will recognize both halves. The leverage token is a call on ETH struck at S. The dollar token is a bond minus an out-of-the-money put, the payoff every covered call writer knows. This is put-call parity minted into two ERC-20s: one share of anything equals a bond plus a call, so splitting the asset manufactures both. Vitalik's own words:
we remove the entire concept of liquidations by making the "base building block" of the system options rather than debt.
The whole thing rests on P + N = 1: the two tokens always add back up to the coin, by construction. That removes liquidations, and it also means the system never needs a price until maturity. Splitting and recombining tokens is just bookkeeping, and anyone who rolls before expiry never touches settlement at all.
That unlocks the oracle designs debt can never use: optimistic oracles with dispute windows, Kleros-arbitrated settlement, prediction markets in front of an expensive recourse oracle. Vitalik notes the construction "literally is 'just' a prediction market", a scalar market of the kind Seer trades today, so synthetics and prediction markets can share one slow, hardened oracle. It is the asset-layer version of his info finance and low-risk DeFi essays.
One more piece of intuition: how do you actually hold a dollar this way? You do not sit at the strike. You hold the dollar token struck far below spot, say half, where its delta is near zero and the token barely notices ETH moving. If ETH grinds down toward your strike, you roll to a lower one, on your own schedule, before it gets close. Compare that to the debt holder's experience of the same crash:
The debt claim is all or nothing: worth par until it breaches the liquidation line, then worth whatever a forced auction returns mid-crash. The dollar token has no line to breach. It reprices smoothly, and even with ETH sitting at the strike it is still a 97-cent claim. How much it loses depends on how far below the strike ETH settles, which is why Vitalik calls the failure mode drift rather than default.
The trade on offer
Debt-based synthetics promise exact tracking and pay for it with a liquidation cliff, locked-up excess collateral, and a real-time oracle dependency. Option-based synthetics accept 1 to 4 percent a year of tracking drift and in exchange delete all three. The rest of this article is about whether that price is real.
None of this is new. TradFi has run the same construction for decades. Buffer ETFs hold over $70 billion of index exposure built entirely from options, with no margin and no liquidation machinery anywhere in the stack. JPMorgan rolls a $22.7 billion collar on the S&P every quarter (we covered the March roll). Box spread traders build synthetic Treasury bills out of options, billions of notional a month. On-chain, Lien Protocol shipped almost exactly this split in 2020 and still died. Why it died is the last section of this article.
What it costs, on live data
So does it work? It hangs on two things: what the embedded option costs to carry, and what the dollar does in an actual crash. We pulled the Deribit ETH surface on June 11, with spot at $1,660, for the first, and built a nine-year backtest for the second.
The dollar token's only market exposure is the put embedded in it, so the carry question reduces to: what does a far out-of-the-money ETH put cost, by tenor, by distance?
Start with distance, because it is almost the whole cost. At 90 percent moneyness, rolling protection costs 1,900 to 3,700 bps a year, which is hopeless. At 50 percent it is roughly 260 bps a year at the 6-month tenor. At 25 percent it rounds to single digits. The cost falls about an order of magnitude for every 25 points of extra distance, which is exactly why you want to sit deep and roll early. Short-dated and deep is basically free: a 7-day put at half of spot prices at about a tenth of a basis point, below Deribit's minimum tick.
The premium that does exist comes off skew, not off some fat volatility premium. On pull day, 30-day at-the-money IV was 55.6 percent against 58.5 realized, while the 10-delta put wing ran 68 to 75. Whoever ends up short these wings is selling crash insurance, and pricing that well is a real business that has to exist for any of this to scale.
Then there is the decay everyone worries about. The obvious objection to "hold options as your savings account" is theta, and it came up within hours of the post. It has the sign backwards:
The dollar holder did not buy a put. They hold a bond minus a put: they are the seller, and time decay accrues to them, the way it does for every covered call writer. The one paying that decay is the leverage holder, in exchange for the leverage. That side of the split usually gets ignored, so look at it:
| Strike | 7-day | 90-day | 180-day | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| (call struck here) | % of ETH | leverage | % of ETH | leverage | % of ETH | leverage |
| $1,49490% of spot cheapest, most levered | 11% | 8.0x | 16% | 4.3x | 23% | 3.0x |
| $1,24575% of spot | 25% | 3.9x | 28% | 3.1x | 33% | 2.5x |
| $83050% of spot* | 50% | 2.0x | 51% | 1.9x | 53% | 1.8x |
| $54833% of spot* most ETH, least leverage | 67% | 1.5x | 68% | 1.5x | 69% | 1.4x |
This is the cleanest part of the whole design. You get real leverage with none of the machinery that blows perp traders up, no funding to bleed and no level where you get force-closed, and the premium its buyers pay is exactly what funds the dollar side. The two legs subsidize each other, or neither exists, the same matching problem every DeFi option vault was built to solve.
Nine years, five crashes, zero liquidations
Pricing a snapshot is not holding the thing. So we ran the proposal's own strategy, mechanically, through every day from August 2017 to this week: hold one synthetic dollar in the dollar token, strike at half of spot, roll the 30-day maturity at expiry, roll the strike down whenever ETH falls within 1.5x of it. Black-Scholes at mid, r = 0, real Deribit DVOL where it exists, flat bps per roll as the cost knob:
Run the full window at 75 percent vol and the result is almost nothing: with free rolls, the synthetic dollar drifts 0.03 percent a year. The embedded short put, three standard deviations out, is worth so little that it neither bleeds nor earns much. On real DVOL (2021 onward), where the elevated 2021-22 vol meant real premium to collect, the dollar actually carried positive 0.57 percent a year. The option leg is not what costs you. At 10 bps per roll the drift becomes minus 1.2 percent a year; at 25 bps, minus 3 percent; at 50 bps, minus 6 percent. That is just twelve rolls a year times whatever each roll costs. What you pay to run this is the cost of trading it, not the cost of the options.
Now the crashes, which are the reason anyone would build this in the first place:
| Episode | ETH drawdown | Dollar token worst dip | CDP at 133% | CDP at 150% |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Aug 2017, Dec 2017, Jan 2018 gaps | >33% intraday | <0.4% | LIQUIDATED | LIQUIDATED |
| Sep 2019 gap | >25% intraday | <0.4% | survived | LIQUIDATED |
| Mar 2020 (COVID) | -62% | -0.2% | LIQUIDATED | LIQUIDATED |
| Jan 2021 gap | >25% intraday | <0.4% | survived | LIQUIDATED |
| May 2021 | -39% | -0.3% | LIQUIDATED | LIQUIDATED |
| May-Jun 2022 (Luna/3AC) | -71% | -0.4% | survived | survived |
| Nov 2022 (FTX) | -30% | -0.2% | survived | survived |
| Feb 2025 | -57% | -0.4% | survived | LIQUIDATED |
| 2026 to date | -48% | -0.5% | survived | survived |
Through a 62 percent COVID crash, a 71 percent Luna/3AC unwind, FTX, and two crashes this cycle, the synthetic dollar's worst option-driven mark-to-market dip in nine years was 0.36 percent at constant IV, 0.74 percent on real DVOL at the June 2022 bottom. It never traded a full cent off the peg, and the strike-down roll triggered exactly three times in 8.8 years (a fourth, in the real-DVOL run, at the June 2022 bottom). The comparison vault, rebalanced with perfect daily discipline, still got liquidated five to eight times, because daily discipline does nothing against a price that gaps down between rebalances. The debt vault's worst case is a sudden event you can't trade your way out of. The option dollar's worst case is a slow bleed you can plan around.
Our read
Vitalik guessed drift of 1 to 4 percent a year and called rolling slippage "the largest risk by which this whole scheme might become uncompetitive." If anything he undersold it. Optionality is nearly free where the strategy actually sits, and effectively all of the running cost is execution. Whether this works comes down to market structure, not options pricing.
The missing piece is the venue
So the construction holds up and the options are cheap. The only real cost is getting filled, twelve times a year, in deep out-of-the-money strikes that have no resting bids today. Vitalik flags this himself:
Rebalancing would be more like one-sided market making than like making an instant sell.
A dollar holder rolling strikes is non-toxic, schedule-insensitive flow: they do not care if the fill happens today or Thursday, they just cannot pay 50 bps for it (the backtest prices that path at minus 6 percent a year). Flow like that is exactly what price-improvement auctions exist to monetize: makers quote uninformed, patient flow far inside the screen because it cannot run them over. The roll itself, sell one strike, buy another, is a two-leg package, which is RFQ territory; resting it on a book leg-by-leg is how you donate the spread twice. We wrote up both mechanisms, and why options need them more than perps, in our RPI piece.
History has already run this experiment in both directions. Lien built this exact split in 2020 with no options market structure around it; the legs sat illiquid and the protocol died. The buffer-ETF complex built the same payoff on top of deep, mature options markets and grew to $70 billion. Same payoff, opposite outcomes, and the only thing that differed was the market underneath it. Builders are already moving on the idea: four days after the post, someone had a physically-settled version live on Base, and the problems they ran into were liquidity for the two tokens and slippage on the roll. Not the math. The trading.
That is why we think this proposal matters more for venues than for protocols. DeFi's first generation of stablecoins was built on money markets: Maker, Aave, Compound, lending books with liquidation engines bolted on. If Vitalik is right, and our numbers say the economics check out, the next generation gets built on options exchanges: deep books in the wings, auctions for patient one-sided flow, atomic multi-leg rolls, and portfolio margin that understands a covered position has no liquidation price.
The bet we are making
Hypercall is an options venue on HyperLiquid with exactly that stack: RPI auctions for screened one-sided flow, atomic multi-leg RFQ for rolls, and quote provider competition to price the wings. We believe the world's largest stablecoin eventually gets built the way Vitalik describes, collateral split into options, nothing to liquidate, settled on a slow oracle. And when it is, it will not live on a money market. It will live on an options exchange. We are building that exchange.
This article is research commentary, not investment advice. Model values are labeled as such; nothing here is a live quote, and the backtest is a simulation with the caveats stated above.