Options into liquidity

How One Options Trade Became 15% of Hyperliquid's S&P 500 Volume

A trader bought a $7,100 bet on the S&P 500 falling. The market maker on the other side spent the next 15 hours hedging it on Hyperliquid, and traded $14.8 million doing it.

Market StructurePerpsEquities

On September 23, one market maker on Hypercall traded 15% of all S&P 500 perp volume on Hyperliquid in 15 hours. That's $14.8 million.

It wasn't a whale taking a view. It was the maker cleaning up after a single options trade. Here's what happened, why one small option creates this much trading, and why that matters for Hyperliquid.

Maker's SP500 delta-hedging volume
Sep 23: $14.8M in just 15 hours, 15% of the whole market. Switch to "Inside the 15 hours" to see where it came from.

The trade

A trader thought the S&P 500 would drop before the close. Instead of shorting it, they bought a same-day put spread. Two legs:

Buy the 7,730 put
Pays if SPX falls below 7,730
$3.65 each
Sell the 7,710 put
Makes it cheaper, caps the payout
$1.31 each

Both expired at 4:00 PM ET the same day. The trader paid $7,100 for about 3,000 spreads. Best case: $60,700. Here's the payoff at expiry. Hover to try any closing price:

Profit at expiry
+$60K+$30K$0−$30K−$60K7,7107,7307,762 at trade7,6807,780
If SPX closes at 7,706.88Trader makes +$53.6KActual close 7,706.88

It worked. SPX closed at 7,706.88, just under the lower strike. The spread paid in full and the trader made $53,600 on $7,100.

Flip the chart to the maker's side. It's the mirror image, and it's the risk the maker had to hedge.

What was the taker thinking?

This wallet is a volatility trader. Its day job is selling options and earning the spread, about a thousand trades in five days. On SP500 it did the other thing vol traders do: buy cheap, short-dated protection when the price looks wrong.

Quiet tape, loud macrorealized vol ~5–10% all week
An index this calm under that much stress is when downside protection gets cheap.
12%
odds the market priced for SPX closing below 7,728
−0.44%
drop needed by the close to break even
8.5×
payout vs. premium if it lands

Sept 23 delivered −0.66% on a 1.1% range. And for $7,100 the trader owned the gamma into the close without ever trading it: the model hedge grew from about 8 units per SPX point at the trade to 13 by 15:00.

It also wasn't a lucky first shot. The same trader had bought SP500 put spreads the two days before and lost both:

Third time's the charm: the week, bet by betnet +$33.6K
Sep 20
Same-week put spreads, 3,400 + 2,300 lots
Sunday, CME closed. SPX rallied 1.25% Monday.
−$6.4K
Sep 21
Next day 7,700/7,660, 6,048 lots for $13.5K
Sept 22 closed flat.
−$13.5K
Sep 23
7,730/7,710, 3,033 lots for $7.1K
This trade. Paid in full.
+$53.6K
Sep 23 · 23:14
Back to the day job: quoted a 10,000-lot 7,630/7,600
The maker bought it. Unsettled at time of writing.
pending

Net, the trader is up $33,600 on the week.

Why did the maker start selling?

The maker sold the trader that put spread. So the maker now loses money if SPX falls. Market makers don't want that bet. They want to earn the spread and go home flat.

TRADER
Long volatility
Wins if SPX moves more than the option priced in.
MAKER, AFTER HEDGING
Short volatility
Direction hedged away. Wins if SPX moves less than priced.

So neither side is really betting on direction. They're betting on how much SPX moves. The hedge strips out the direction and leaves the maker holding only that volatility bet.

So they offset it: short the S&P 500 perp. If the market drops, the short makes back what the options lose. The maker's first sale hit Hyperliquid 911 milliseconds after the option trade.

If SPX falls
The puts get more valuable
The maker owes the trader more
So it sells more perps
If SPX rises
The puts lose value
The maker needs less protection
So it buys perps back
Every tick changes how much hedge the maker needs. That's why one option trade turns into thousands of perp trades.

How big should the hedge be?

That number is called delta. Hit replay to watch it through the real day, or drag SPX and the clock yourself:

01:56 tradeUTC 01:5520:00 expiry
SPX7,762
Time to expiry18h 04m
3,0001,5000UNITS SHORTat trade time7,7107,7307,6807,800
Model says be short
349 units
Maker actually net sold
80 units
Near where SPX was when the option traded. The model says short ~350 units; the maker actually sold 275 in its first two hours.
Replay uses the actual SPX path on Sept 23. Model is an illustrative Black-Scholes estimate at 12% vol, not the maker's own. Actual hedge is net units sold since midnight, from the fill tape through expiry. Red toasts are hedge sells Hyperliquid rejected for insufficient margin (order history from 14:59 UTC).

Run the clock toward zero and the curve narrows into a spike between the strikes. That's gamma: late in the day, a few points of SPX can swing the hedge by hundreds of units. That's why the maker kept trading.

A day of hedging, trade to expiry

The maker sold 275 units in the first two hours. Then it spent the rest of the day buying and selling around that level as SPX drifted toward the strikes. Tap any hour:

SPX7,730 strike7,710 strikeBoughtSoldSells rejected: out of margin
OUT OF MARGIN~180 sells rejected / hrSPX7,7707,7507,7307,710option trade 01:56buysell00:0004:0008:0012:0016:0019:00
01:00 UTCBought 0.0Sold 86.3Net since midnight: -86.3
Sept 23, 00:00–20:00 UTC (expiry). Units of the SP500 perp (1 unit ≈ $7,760). Rejections from the wallet's order history, which reaches back to 14:59 UTC.

Look at the middle of the day. Big green and red bars, but the net barely moves. Most of that $14.8 million was the maker adjusting, not adding. Sell a little when SPX ticks down, buy a little when it ticks up, over and over.

Then the afternoon goes quiet, and not by choice. As SPX slid into the strikes, the model wanted the hedge to grow toward 1,000 units short and beyond. The maker's engine kept trying to sell, but from 15:00 to expiry Hyperliquid rejected about 180 of its sell orders an hour for insufficient margin, and the hedge stayed stuck near 275 units sold while the spread it was hedging paid out in full.

How does $7,100 become $14.8 million?

Three things multiplied together: an option that expires the same day, an index that wouldn't sit still, and the strikes it kept wandering around.

1. Same-day options are cheap to buy and wild to hedge

A 0DTE option has hours left, so there's little time value: the spread cost $2.34 each. But with so little time, the hedge flips from "almost nothing" to "almost everything" over a few points of SPX.

Hedge needed vs. SPX, as expiry gets closer
18h6h2h30m
3,0000UNITS SHORT7,7107,7307,6807,800
$7,100
premium paid
$60.7K
most it can pay out
~$23M
peak hedge, near expiry between strikes

At the trade, 18 hours out, the hedge moved about 8 units per SPX point. By 15:00 it was 13. In the last half hour, sitting between the strikes, a 5-point move could swing it by more than 800 units.

2. SPX kept moving, and kept coming back

SPX, trade to expiry · Sept 2301:56 → 20:00 UTC
strikes
780 pts
traveled, minute by minute
−55 pts
where it actually ended up
2,084×
hedge volume ÷ premium

Every one of those wiggles changed the hedge a little, and the maker traded every change. Volume comes from the path, not the destination. SPX spent the afternoon sliding into the strike zone, right where the hedge moves most.

3. Different days, different volume

Same trade, different day. We simulated 80 days for each kind of market and hedged the spread through each one:

strikes
Estimated hedge volume
$31.4M
$17.9M – $41.0M
white tick = the real Sept 23 ($15.6M)
Same volatility, same 0.66% drop, landing right at the strikes. Most simulated days trade more than the real $15.6M, which drifted sideways for hours before the drop.
Median of 80 simulated days per market, Black-Scholes deltas at 12% vol, scaled so the real Sept 23 path matches the wallet's actual volume. Range is 10th–90th percentile.

The pattern: where SPX ends up relative to the strikes matters more than how wild the day is. Days that finish near the strikes trade 3–5× more hedge volume than days that drift away. Doubling the volatility adds only about 15%.

What if the maker had kept hedging?

Here's the twist. The maker tracked the model closely until about 12:00 UTC, then stalled. Hedge volume fell from $1–2M an hour to almost nothing, right as SPX slid into the strikes and the hedge it needed kept growing. From 15:00 we can see why: Hyperliquid was rejecting its sell orders for insufficient margin, about 180 an hour.

Model says be shortMaker actually shortUnhedged
05001,0001,500UNITS SHORTsells rejected: out of marginhedge stalls · 12:0002:0006:0012:0018:0020:00
What happened
Stuck near 270 units short from noon
Option: premium minus payout−$53.6K
Hedge P&L+$12.8K
Fees−$1.3K
Perp volume$14.8M
Maker net−$42.1K
Kept hedging (estimate)
Like its morning: rebalances when it drifts 18 units from the model
Option: premium minus payout−$53.6K
Hedge P&L≈ +$61.4K
Fees + spread≈ −$25.2K
Perp volume≈ $157M
Maker net≈ −$17.3K
"What happened" is measured from the maker's fills, marked at the 20:00 price. "Kept hedging" replays the afternoon on real one-minute prices, rebalancing to the Black-Scholes target (12% vol) whenever the gap passes the band; 18 units reproduces the maker's own pre-noon volume. Costs assume its real 1.68 bps, which is optimistic at this size: most of the extra volume lands in the last hour.

By 18:00 the model wanted about 1,500 units short. The maker held about 270. Then SPX closed below 7,710, the long put kicked in, and the hedge the model wanted collapsed to zero at the bell.

Hedging through the afternoon would have cut the maker's loss from about $42K to somewhere between $6K and $17K, depending on how tightly it tracked the model. It would also have traded many times more volume: $60M to $140M more, most of it in the last hour, when every point of SPX moved the hedge by hundreds of units. That is a large share of a day on which the whole market traded about $190M, so the real cost of pushing it through would have been higher than the 1.68 bps assumed here.

What did the hedge cost?

Perp fills1,988
Fees paid$1,333
Fee rate0.9 bps
What 1 bp is worth$1,481

Every one of those fills was a taker order. The maker never waited; it always crossed the spread. At $14.8 million of turnover, every basis point saved is about $1,500.

Three ways to hedge

Every time delta moves, the maker has to trade back to flat. It can do that three ways, from patient to urgent. Pick one:

ILLUSTRATIVE BOOK · MAKER NEEDS TO SELL
7,770.4
7,770.3
7,770.2
+ YOUR OFFER JOINS
7,770.1
mid · spread 0.2
7,770.0
7,769.9
7,769.8
Post a sell order at the best offer and wait for a buyer to trade into it.
Use it whenThe hedge is close to target and the market is calm. Far from expiry, low gamma.CostEarns about half the spread. Pays the lower maker fee.The bookAdds depth. The next buyer has more to trade against.RiskIt might not fill before SPX moves.

The most sophisticated hedging engines use all three. They rest orders while the hedge is close to target, tighten as it drifts, and cross only when the risk is too big to wait. So most options makers both add liquidity to the book and take it.

This wallet only did the third. Every order it sent was immediate-or-cancel, so every hedge trade crossed the spread. Here's what that looked like on the real book.

What the hedge did to the book

This is Hyperliquid's SP500 book on Sept 23, the day of the trade. Brighter bands are more resting orders; rings are the wallet's trades. It opens on If rested: the same hedge posted as resting orders, adding depth instead of taking it. Flip to Actual to see what it really took from the book. Open it full screen to replay every trade.

What if it hadn't only taken?

We re-ran the day's 359 hedge trades three ways, using the real book and the queue ahead at each price. Resting is cheaper, and it actually adds volume: while an order waits, delta keeps moving, so the maker ends up trading more to catch up.

Take only
What actually happened. Every order crossed the spread.
Hedging cost$2,618
1.68 bps on volume
Perp volume$15.6M
actual
Hedged instantly, every time.
Mix
Rest when the queue would fill in under 2 min (253 trades), cross the rest.
Hedging cost~$1,370
~0.75 bps on volume
Perp volume~$18.2M
+17% vs. actual
Most hedges done within 2 min.
Rest only
Post every hedge as a resting order and wait.
Hedging cost~$570
~0.29 bps on volume
Perp volume~$19.6M
+26% vs. actual
Some hedges wait up to 30 min. Risky near expiry.
Estimates. Resting orders assume zero maker fee and earn half the spread; fill time comes from the size already queued at that price. Extra volume models half of the Black-Scholes delta drift during each wait, re-hedged at the actual taker cost.

That's why the most sophisticated engines mix. A mixed hedge would have cost about half as much and put about 17% more volume through Hyperliquid, most of it as resting liquidity other traders could hit.

Why hedge on Hyperliquid?

Makers can hedge on other venues and post collateral on Hypercall, so why Hyperliquid? Below, a model hedge for this put spread (Black-Scholes delta, rebalanced all the way to expiry) trades into Hyperliquid, Binance and Lighter at once, each trade priced on that venue's full order book at that minute. Press play:

Hedged to expiry, the spread costs about $34K to hedge on Hyperliquid: 5.3× less than Binance and 7.4× less than Lighter. Switch to Actual to replay the 359 trades the maker really made: about $1,760 on Hyperliquid, against $7,200 on Binance and $5,050 on Lighter. Watch the ladders: on Hyperliquid most trades barely dent the first basis point, while on Lighter they walk several ticks deep. Binance is tight at the very top but thins out fast, and charges a 4 bps taker fee.

Switch to Rest and Hyperliquid still comes out cheapest, 3.8× under Binance. A resting order only fills as fast as that venue's own traders show up, and Hyperliquid has by far the most of them: about $85M of taker flow each way over the day, against about $25M on Binance and under $2M on Lighter. For clips this size even Hyperliquid fills only part of each order within five minutes, so resting costs more than taking here. The gap between venues is what holds.

Under each venue, the maker's P&L makes the point directly: the option and the hedge are identical everywhere, so only the venue's costs separate the outcomes. The gear opens the assumptions: fee tiers, account types, how long to rest, and the volatility behind the model hedge, including Hypercall's own theo vol for these puts.

Everyone can see it's a hedge

Normally, a big taker is scary. Market makers widen their quotes because whoever is hitting them might know something they don't. That's toxic flow.

This hedge is different. The option trade is public on Hypercall. The perp fills are public on Hyperliquid. And the hedge size follows mechanically from delta. Anyone watching can see it's rebalancing, not a view.

Someone recently shared this paper with me, which rigorously studies the execution improvement of visible TWAPs on Hyperliquid: "Trading in the Sunshine or in the Shade: Market Impact and Adverse Selection on Hyperliquid," by Davide Barone and Fabrizio Lillo. In physics, theorists can say all they want, but the case isn't closed until an experimentalist comes with the cold hard data. So thank you to the authors of this paper for their hard work! The paper demonstrates that liquidity net tightens as onchain TWAPs surface, improving the average execution of the TWAP order. This has been a deeply personal question for me. Even before building Hyperliquid, I've defended from first principles that transparent trading ought to improve execution for non-toxic flow. This is a corrollary of the efficient market hypothesis, but the amount of pushback always surprised me. I've quote tweeted a previous post where I make the argument in detail. Transparency and equal access bring improved execution over traditional private venues. It's an honor to build with everyone to upgrade the financial system with onchain technology. Show more

jeff.hl
jeff.hl
@chameleon_jeff

Thank you to everyone who took the time to thoughtfully respond to my post on transparent markets. I understand that the thesis is controversial and that Hyperliquid is at a new frontier as the first fully transparent order book venue of its scale. I could well be mistaken, and welcome the continuous dialogue on market structure innovation. However, many criticisms I saw stemmed from misunderstandings, with some points actually supporting transparent systems like Hyperliquid. Market structure is notoriously counterintuitive, and novel approaches often challenge established paradigms, leading to understandable skepticism.…

2.4K
Reply
Unknown taker
Someone sells $500K, fast
Makers can't tell why
They widen and pull size
Visible hedge
A put spread prints on Hypercall
The same wallet sells about delta × size
Makers can quote tight against it

Flow that carries no information is cheap to fill. Research on flow toxicity makes the same point: makers who can tell informed from uninformed orders can quote the uninformed ones tighter. So even though this hedge takes liquidity, being visible should get it better prices over time.

What this means

A $7,100 option became $14.8 million of perp volume. That's the multiplier. Every option on Hypercall has a hedge, and the hedge trades on Hyperliquid.

More strategies mean more hedging. Hedges that rest add bids and offers. Hedges that everyone can see get tighter quotes. All of it makes the book deeper, which makes options cheaper to quote, which brings more trades. We saw the same loop in our oil perps analysis.

Want to go deeper?
See delta and gamma in our reference docs for how hedge ratios are calculated.

Sources

This analysis is educational. Not financial advice. Options trading involves risk of loss.